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Although there is extensive scholarship on court-curbing efforts directed at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, much less is known about bills targeting the lower federal courts.  This 
paper argues that members of Congress also engage in position taking with respect to the  
U.S. Courts of Appeals, by proposing legislation to divide up the Ninth Circuit. Over 
seven decades, no other circuit has attracted as much court-curbing legislation as the 
Ninth Circuit, and yet no bill has succeeded.  What accounts for this persistent focus on 
one court? We argue that bill sponsors are primarily motivated by electoral 
considerations and capitalize on the perception of the Ninth Circuit as an extremely 
liberal court.  Using an original dataset of all bills to split the Ninth Circuit, we find that 
sponsorship of splitting bills is linked to legislator party, ideology, and state public mood 
relative to California, and that only conservative, Republican members of Congress are 
responsive to performance-related indicators, like caseload increases and Supreme Court 
oversight. The results suggest that our current understanding of court curbing as it applies 
to the Supreme Court can be extended to new judicial contexts.  
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Political Opportunism, Position Taking, and Court-Curbing Legislation 
If judicial independence is a central and defining feature of the American political 
system (Rosenberg 1992: 369), then measures intended to dilute the power of courts 
undermine the separation of powers and impair the judiciary’s ability to resolve 
contentious political and legal disputes. But the line between judicial reform and political 
interference can sometimes to be difficult to discern.  Clark (2011: 26) contends that 
attempts to constrain, or curb, the judiciary should be thought of as “electoral posturing in 
response to public opinion (or efforts to galvanize public opinion)” or as a way “to create 
an issue constituency and politicize the judiciary.” Thus, studying the interactions 
between Congress and the courts sheds light on the electoral connection (Mayhew 1974), 
telling us how bills that nominally deal with restructuring the judiciary also serve as a 
vehicle for communicating to constituents and organized interests.   
To date, the court curbing literature has focused on the Supreme Court (Nichols, 
Bridge, and Carrington 2014; Clark 2011; Handberg and Hill 1979; Nagel 1965), and to a 
lesser degree, state supreme courts (Leonard 2016).  This literature has helped scholars to 
identify the incentives behind such proposals, regardless of their success or failure, and 
also provided a window into inter-branch relations between legislative and judicial 
institutions (Bridge and Nichols 2016).   
Yet relatively little work has focused on Congressional attempts to engage in 
court curbing with respect to the lower federal courts.1  These courts are the workhorses 
of the federal judiciary, resolving tens of thousands of cases each year.  In particular, the 
                                               
1 For an overview of various court reform proposals, see Hellman (1990; 2000), Tobias 
(1996), Kline (1998), and Posner (2000).  
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U.S. Courts of Appeals play a prominent role in developing legal policy (Bowie, Songer, 
and Szmer 2014; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 2000), as well as correcting legal errors 
made below.  Out of all the federal appellate courts, only one circuit has been 
consistently targeted by Congress in court curbing bills over an extensive period of time:  
the Ninth Circuit.  From 1955 to 2011, legislators in both chambers introduced a total of 
42 bills that would split the Ninth Circuit in some fashion.2 In comparison, there have 
only been a total of 11 splitting bills introduced that targeted other circuits, which were 
ultimately successful in splitting the Eighth and the Fifth Circuits, respectively.  
Against this backdrop, we argue that circuit-splitting attempts against the Ninth 
Circuit in particular should be understood as a form of court curbing and that, like court 
curbing bills directed at the Supreme Court, they are primarily a form of position taking 
(Mayhew 1974) by members of Congress. Although the Ninth Circuit is a federal court 
with a regional jurisdiction, it has developed a national reputation unlike any other of the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, as evidenced by national attention from conservative pundits and 
politicians outside the states covered in the Ninth Circuit. For instance, conservative talk 
radio personality Rush Limbaugh frequently refers to the court as the “Ninth Circus” and 
the “Nutty Ninth” on his show (e.g., 2003, 2006, 2013), where he highlights liberal 
decisions that he believes to be wrongly decided. Similarly, former Fox News 
commentator Glenn Beck observed, “If the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals says it’s one 
way, it must be the other” (www.glennbeck.com).  The popular conservative columnist 
                                               
2 Though this is beyond the scope of our data, it is worth noting that at least seven 
additional bills were introduced between 2011 and 2017. For reasons we discuss later in 
the paper, we are unable to carry the analysis through to the present day.  
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George Will has singled out the Ninth Circuit for attention in his columns, calling it 
“incorrigible,” “a slow learner,” and a “stimulus package for the Supreme Court,” all in 
reference to the court’s reversal rate (Will 2010; see also Will 2006). In 2006, World Net 
Daily, a conservative website, praised a children’s book by Katharine DeBrecht called 
Help! Mom! The Ninth Circuit Nabbed the Nativity! or How the Liberals Stole Christmas 
(www.wnd.com).    
Conservative critiques have not been limited to members of the media. In 2011, 
during a primary debate, Republican presidential candidate Newt Gingrich told 
moderator Megyn Kelly that he would abolish federal judges for “anti-American” 
rulings:   “I’ve been working on this project since 2002 when the Ninth Circuit court 
said that ‘one nation under God’ is unconstitutional in the Pledge of Allegiance. And I 
decided that if you had judges that were so radically anti-American that they thought ‘one 
nation under God’ was wrong, they shouldn’t be on the court” (Edwards 2011). 
In this paper, we argue that the symbolic politics related to California and the so-
called “ultra-liberal Ninth” (www.saf.org) have made this particular court an attractive 
target for position taking by conservative members of Congress.3  Using an original 
dataset of all sponsors and co-sponsors of bills to split the Ninth Circuit, we find that 
(co)sponsorship of splitting legislation is driven by legislator ideology, party, and state 
                                               
3 To be clear, we do not take the position that the Ninth Circuit is a liberal outlier among 
the other circuits, as this is not supported by the data. An examination of the median 
Judicial Common Space scores for the time period of our study finds that the Ninth 
Circuit comes in as the third most liberal court, behind the Second Circuit and the Third 
Circuit.  We discuss the reasons for the Ninth Circuit’s reputation later in the paper. 
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public mood, but not by ideological distance between the legislator and the Ninth Circuit. 
While members of Congress do sponsor more splitting bills in conjunction with increases 
in caseload and Supreme Court oversight, our results suggest that conservative, 
Republican legislators sponsor legislation to capitalize on the public’s perceptions of the 
Ninth Circuit as an extremely liberal court.   
Our findings contribute to the literatures on court curbing and Congressional 
behavior and have implications for how we understand Congressional oversight of the 
judiciary. By extending existing research focused on the Supreme Court to a new 
institutional context, this paper helps to build a more nuanced understanding of the 
dynamics at work in multiple levels of the judicial system.  
Court curbing as position taking 
 To understand why members of Congress would introduce legislation that would 
curtail the powers of courts, it is essential to go back to the insights of Mayhew (1974), 
who famously described legislators as “single minded seekers of re-election.” In 
Mayhew’s account, members of Congress prioritize three types of activities that serve 
this ultimate goal: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking.  The last of these, 
position taking, refers to “a public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything 
likely to be of interest to political actors” and includes a range of symbolic actions (Hill 
and Hurley 2002), including bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship (Mayhew 1974, 61-64).   
Subsequent scholarship has found empirical support for Mayhew’s 
characterization of bill (co)sponsorship as position taking, linked with electoral 
incentives (Hall 1996; Meinke 2008; Harward and Moffett 2010).  For instance, Lazarus 
(2013) argues that the majority of bills introduced in Congress reflect position taking by 
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members.  Compared to roll call votes (another form of position taking), sponsoring bills 
is attractive because it is less risky than a vote and can appear to constituents to be a 
credible step in the electoral process (Lazarus 2013) even though a very small percentage 
of bills actually make it to a vote (Krutz 2005). In an examination of several policy areas, 
Lazarus finds that sponsorship of bills closely tracks the salience of local issues within a 
member’s district or state. Similarly, Rocca and Gordon (2010) characterize bill 
sponsorship as position taking that is undertaken in order to signal support for issues of 
concern to “members of an attentive public” (i.e., interest groups); such groups, in turn, 
reward legislators with campaign contributions.  Surveys of constituents also find that 
individuals’ ability to identify a reason for liking their House member is positively 
related to the number of bills introduced by the member of Congress (Box-Steffensmeier 
et al. 2003; Parker and Goodman 2009).   Taken as a whole, this research suggests that 
members of Congress will sponsor or co-sponsor court-curbing bills when it suits their 
electoral needs.    
In the most comprehensive studies of court-curbing attempts to date, Clark (2009, 
2011) has argued that members of Congress introduce court-curbing legislation targeting 
the Supreme Court primarily as a response to public opinion and thus are engaging in 
position taking. The (co)sponsorship of bills is intended to “signal public discontent, 
politicize the Court, and erode public confidence in the judiciary” (Clark 2011: 49).4 
                                               
4 Because court curbing is position taking, Clark argues that it is immaterial how far a bill 
actually makes it through the legislative process, as the mere presence of the bill itself 
serves the intended purpose.  Indeed, most of the bills in Clark’s study fail to move out of 
committee. 
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Clark argues that these bills also serve as a “credible signal” to the Supreme Court about 
its judicial legitimacy and standing with the public (2009: 972).  Empirically, this 
argument receives some support, as both public opposition to the Supreme Court and the 
ideological distance between the Court and the member of Congress predict the 
(co)sponsorship of court-curbing bills (Clark 2011: 144). This is also consistent with 
other work on early periods of court curbing (1802-1954), which concluded that both 
public opinion and party dynamics have historically been important factors in 
understanding the occurrence of such bills targeting the Supreme Court (Nagel 1965). 5   
 Although most court-curbing scholarship focuses on the interactions between 
Congress and the Supreme Court (Hansford and Damore 2000; Handberg and Hill 1980; 
Nagel 1965; Rosenberg 1992), there are a few examples of court-curbing research that 
consider other courts.  Bell and Scott (2006) analyze bills that would alter the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts and find that House sponsors of such bills in the contemporary era 
(1973-2000) have tended to be conservative Republicans.  At the state level, Leonard 
(2016) also finds an ideological dimension to court curbing, with more conservative 
legislatures introducing more court-curbing bills and greater ideological distance between 
the legislative and judicial branches driving more bills.  
Circuit-splitting bills as court curbing 
 Building on the extant court-curbing literature, we argue that circuit-splitting 
proposals can be understood as part of broader trends in inter-branch relations and serve 
                                               
5 Along these lines, recent work argues that court-curbing attacks on the Supreme Court 
are best understood as a way to achieve and maintain party dominance, and can be useful 
signals for coalition building (Nichols and Bridge 2016). 
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similar electoral purposes as bills intended to curb the Supreme Court.  We contend that 
circuit splitting bills can be considered a type of court curbing because they 
fundamentally represent attempts to limit a court’s power (Clark 2011; Rosenberg 1992). 
Indeed, proposals to make changes to a court’s jurisdiction are routinely counted as court 
curbing in studies focused on Congress and the Supreme Court (Nagel 1965; Rosenberg 
1992; Bell and Scott 2006; Clark 2009, 2011).6  A circuit-splitting bill, by definition, 
seeks to change the geographic jurisdiction of a court (by carving a new circuit out of an 
old one) and thereby redistributes power to decide cases over multiple courts.7  In 
reference to the Fifth and Ninth Circuit split proposals, Hellman (1990: 353) argues that 
“[a]lmost any change in the structure of judicial institutions…ultimately help[s] to 
determine who decides [emphasis in the original]. And politicians know that who decides 
will often affect the substance of that decision.”   
[Figure 1 here] 
To be sure, the Ninth Circuit is by no means the only circuit that has been the 
target of circuit-splitting bills, as both the Eighth and the Fifth Circuits were targets of 
                                               
6 Clark (2011: 19) defines court curbing as “the introduction of legislation that threatens 
to restrict, remove, or otherwise limit the Court’s power.”  Similarly, Rosenberg (1992: 
377) defines it as “legislation introduced in Congress having as its purpose or effect, 
either explicit or implicit, Court reversal of a decision or line of decisions, or Court 
abstention from future decisions of a given kind, or alteration in the structure or 
functioning of the Court to produce a particular substantive outcome.” 
7 The geographic change may also be accompanied by a de facto change in subject matter 
jurisdiction, if the reorganization removes states with certain types of cases. 
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several splitting attempts in the 20th century (Stanley and Russell 1982; Walker and 
Barrow 1988).  However, the Ninth Circuit stands apart from these historical examples 
for several reasons.  First, no other circuit has been the focus of such a sustained effort 
over a lengthy period of time.  Efforts to split the Ninth Circuit date back to 1941.  As 
shown in Figure 1, there was a lull in efforts during the 1950s and 1960s, but attempts 
picked up again in the mid-1970s and continued into the first decade of the 2000s. In 
contrast, to the best of our knowledge, there were only three bills that attempted to divide 
the Eighth Circuit, beginning in 1925 and concluding in 1929 when a bill creating the 
Tenth Circuit was signed into law (Stanley and Russell 1982). The movement to split the 
Fifth Circuit extended for a longer period of time, beginning in 1963 and concluding in 
1980 with the creation of the new Eleventh Circuit, after a total of 8 bills. 
There are two other distinguishing features of Ninth Circuit bills as well. Hellman 
(1996: 296) notes that the splitting of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits came only after there 
was “unanimity of professional opinion” of the lawyers and judges in the region, which 
has not been the case in the Ninth Circuit (Goodwin 1989; Hug 1996). Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the Ninth Circuit is distinguished by virtue of the fact that 
none of the many splitting proposals have succeeded, unlike in both the Eighth and the 
Fifth Circuits.8  Given the sheer persistence of bill sponsors over such a long period of 
time, there may be more electoral utility in proposing legislation for a split than for 
actually passing legislation for a split, a point we return to in our concluding remarks. 
                                               
8 Over its history, the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit has been enlarged several times to 
account for the addition of then-territories Hawaii and Alaska, as well as Guam and the 
Northern Mariana Islands. None of these changes has ever reduced its jurisdiction.  
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The duration and persistence of legislative efforts to split the Ninth suggests that 
there have long been electoral incentives for legislators to sponsor what amounts to 
symbolic legislation to split up the Ninth Circuit. And while many proponents of splitting 
the Ninth Circuit have pointed to administrative concerns related to addressing the court’s 
size and efficiency (Tjoflat 1993: 70; Burns 1996: 251; O’Scannlain and Tallman 2004),9 
prior work on circuit splitting suggests that members of Congress generally have few 
electoral incentives to take up court reform on its own terms and, as such, are more likely 
to take up the cause when it also satisfies political objectives (Barrow and Walker 1998).   
To wit, one Senate aide observed that court reform issues “certainly don’t have a landed 
constituency that can make campaign contributions.  The public doesn’t view courts 
issues as something that is important for them” (Barrow and Walker 1998: 252-253).  But 
if the general public is not clamoring for court reform, the literature suggests that 
legislators will engage in position taking that seeks to limit the court in order to signal 
their sympathy with members of the attentive public (Rocca and Gordon 2010) and the 
re-election constituency (Fenno 1978) who are dissatisfied with the court’s decisions. 
In sum, we argue that the Ninth Circuit presents a unique opportunity for 
members of Congress to engage in position taking (Mayhew 1974) because of what the 
court has come to symbolize nationally:  liberal rulings and judicial activism.  
The Ninth Circuit and symbolic politics 
In 2002, a panel of Ninth Circuit judges held that schools could not require 
students to recite the pledge with the words “under God” in Newdow v. Elk Grove Unified 
                                               
9 Tuesday November 23, 2004.  “Take our Ninth Circuit Court—Please!” (Archival 
material on file with the author.) 
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School District.10  This controversial decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which reversed the ruling on a technicality without deciding on the merits of the case. In 
response to what has come to be known as the “Pledge of Allegiance” case, members of 
Congress introduced numerous resolutions affirming their commitment to the Pledge – 
and they also have repeatedly referenced this case when sponsoring legislation to divide 
up the Ninth Circuit.11  As mentioned previously, Republican presidential candidate Newt 
Gingrich identified the Newdow decision as the motivation for his proposal to abolish 
federal judges responsible for “anti-American” rulings (Edwards 2011).  Other high 
profile cases from the Ninth Circuit that attracted criticism from conservatives include a 
series of environmental decisions related to the protection of the spotted owl in the 1980s 
and 90s (Wasby 2014), death penalty decisions, and a 2011 ruling against the “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy banning gays and lesbians from serving openly in the military.  
Referencing the court’s reputation for liberal decisions, one sponsor of a splitting bill, 
Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ) described the Ninth Circuit as producing “contemptuous 
judgments” that “tear at the moral fabric of our nation” (Bonforte 2009: 46).     
                                               
10 Ironically, this decision was authored by neither a liberal nor a Californian. Judge 
Alfred Goodwin was nominated to the bench by President Nixon to fill an Oregon seat on 
the Ninth Circuit.  
11 For instance, H.Res. 459 (sponsored by Wisconsin Republican Representative James 
Sensenbrenner) was entitled “Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives that 
Newdow v. U.S. Congress was erroneously decided.” A total of 182 co-sponsors signed 
on to the resolution. 
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In addition to a few controversial, high profile decisions, the reputation as an 
“ultra liberal court” may also be tied to the ratio of Democratic to Republican appointees 
on the court. Since the Carter Administration, the Ninth Circuit has had more Democratic 
appointees than Republicans (Haire 2006), although with the appointments of subsequent 
Republican presidents, the circuit has grown more ideologically diverse (Schwartz 2010). 
Thus, because of the Ninth Circuit’s association with liberal politics and with 
California (Banks 2000; Kline 1998), position taking on the Ninth Circuit can be 
beneficial for legislators who are seeking to show their conservative constituents that they 
are taking a stand.  In response to public opinion on the judiciary, splitting bills can also 
send a message to a “regional outlier” to get back in line (e.g., Powe 2000; Klarman 
1996; but see Hall and Black 2013).   
 The Ninth Circuit bills can also be understood as part of a broader political 
strategy by conservative lawmakers seeking to rein in the federal judiciary and restrain 
“liberal activist judges” (Keele and Malmsheimer 2016).  Indeed, in his interviews with 
Congressional staffers, Clark (2011: 88) finds that members of Congress frequently 
respond to Ninth Circuit decisions by proposing court-curbing bills directed at the 
Supreme Court.  Even members of Congress who represent states outside the Ninth 
Circuit have reported hearing complaints from their constituents about the Ninth Circuit, 
with demands that they “rein in these activist judges” (Clark 2011: 83).  
Remaking the federal judiciary in a conservative image was a key part of the 
Reagan Revolution and allowed lawmakers to push back against what they perceived as 
liberal excesses by the federal courts (Clark 2011: 58). In the mid-1990s, there were 
concerted Republican efforts to limit President Clinton’s impact on the composition of 
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the federal courts, facilitated by the leadership of Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and Henry Hyde (R-Iowa) on the House Judiciary Committee 
(Banks 2000).  Bell and Scott (2006) find that conservatism is a key predictor of 
introducing court-curbing bills, and in the post-war era, court-curbing efforts directed at 
the Supreme Court in the post-war period were dominated by conservatives, in spite of 
the increasing conservatism of the Court in the latter part of the 20th century (Clark 
2011).  However, liberal members of Congress began pushing back against the Rehnquist 
and Roberts courts in the 2001 to 2008 period (Clark 2011), highlighting that ideological 
incongruence is an important driver of court-curbing behavior on both sides of the 
political spectrum. 
Of course, there are other reasons why a member of Congress would sponsor 
legislation aimed at dividing up the Ninth Circuit.  It is undisputed that the Ninth Circuit 
covers the largest geographic area of any circuit, including the states and territories of 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, 
Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam.  It also sees a far greater number of case filings 
than its peers and has the largest number of authorized judgeships of any circuit to date 
(www.fjc.gov).12 In a law review symposium about judicial structure, Ninth Circuit Judge 
Proctor Hug noted:  “Some commentators assert that the circuit is simply too big, the 
geographical expanse is too extensive, and the population is too large” (2000-2001: 
322).13  
                                               
12 High travel expenses for attorneys in the circuit have been a recurring theme in 
splitting proposals, dating as far back as 1937 (Banks 2000: 38). 
13 In a 1996 letter to Sen. Charles Grassley, Ninth Circuit Judge Alfred Goodwin rejected 
 13 
Another reason for reform offered by proponents of a circuit split has to do with 
the number of Supreme Court reversals of the court.  For instance, a group of state and 
federal lawmakers calling for the split asserted that, in 2010, the Ninth Circuit had “three 
times as many reversals as most circuits had cases before the Supreme Court” 
(www.azgovernor.gov).  Along similar lines, Justice Antonin Scalia testified before the 
1998 Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts for Appeals that the 
high reversal rate is a function of the Ninth Circuit’s use of the limited en banc procedure 
(whereby a subset of judges are randomly chosen for the en banc panel).14  However, this 
contention has been disputed by both Ninth Circuit judges (Farris 1997) and scholars 
(Wasby 2001; Hellman 2000; but see Scott 2006). 
Lastly, supporters of a split sometimes have emphasized the desire of other states 
to be free of a circuit dominated by California.   Barrow and Walker (1988: 8) observe 
that early attempts to split the Ninth in the 1960s were motivated by “the desire of the 
Pacific Northwestern states to have a circuit of their own, independent of the growing 
presence of the state of California.” Historically, California has been more liberal in its 
politics compared to a number of the other states in the Ninth Circuit, such as Alaska, 
Montana, and Idaho (Wheeler 2017).  Indeed, political references to California made by 
                                                                                                                                            
the size argument:  “In my experience, size is irrelevant…I have visited large courts that 
enjoyed amiable and friendly relations regardless of different political backgrounds, and I 
have visited small courts where some judges would wait for another elevator rather than 
ride with each other” (Letter on file with the author). 
14 This testimony is available from the University of North Texas library at: 
http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/hearings/submitted/pdf/Scalia1.pdf 
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Republican officials and conservative pundits often use the state’s name as shorthand for 
liberal politics run amok. For instance, the Republican governor Texas, Greg Abbott, 
bemoaned in 2015 how the policies of cities like Austin were turning the “Texas miracle” 
into a “California nightmare” (Wright 2017). Apart from politics, California also 
contributes the most to the high caseload of the Ninth Circuit (www.fjc.gov) because, as 
one judge from the circuit put it: “there are 33 million people in California, and …they 
love to sue each other” (Moyer 2008). Thus, Congressional proposals to split the circuit 
may be as much about targeting California as they are about targeting the court as a 
whole.   
In his seminal study of court-curbing attempts, Nagel (1965) noted that 
regionalism was an important factor in understanding where court-curbing attacks 
originate.  In the context of changes to circuit jurisdiction, however, regionalism is often 
hard to disentangle from dissatisfaction with policy outcomes.15  Along these lines, 
proponents of splitting the Ninth Circuit have often made reference to irreconcilable 
regional differences, usually between California and the states in the Pacific Northwest 
(Banks 2000; Kline 1998).  A frequent sponsor of splitting bills, Senator Slade Gorton 
(R-Washington) referenced this sentiment in a 1989 speech on the Senate floor, saying, 
“We in the Northwest have developed our own interests in every aspect of the law from 
natural resources to international trade.  Our interest cannot be fully addressed from a 
                                               
15 For instance, a number of the sources interviewed by Barrow and Walker (1988) about 
the Fifth Circuit split assert that Senator James Eastland of Mississippi supported the split 
because he was upset with the desegregation decisions of judges in the western part of the 
circuit. 
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California perspective.”16 A federal district judge from Oregon, Judge Owen Panner, 
observed that the “problems and the concerns of the Northwest and the Southwest are just 
about as far apart as you might imagine” (Albert 1993).   
However, some Ninth Circuit judges have taken issue with the notion that purely 
regional concerns are behind splitting attempts and criticisms of the court.  Former Chief 
Judge Alfred Goodwin, author of a controversial decision about the protection of the 
spotted owl, characterized Senator Gorton’s references to Northwest interests as “simply 
catchphrases used to describe the powerful timber industry’s bitterness over recent Ninth 
Circuit decisions on environmental law” (Trigoboff 1989: 1). This sentiment was echoed 
by another chief judge of the Ninth Circuit, who asserted that sponsors of splitting bills 
“generally couched [their bills] in terms of effective judicial administration,” but that the 
“principal motivation” was “their dissatisfaction with some of the decisions of our court 
dealing with the environment, endangered species, Native Americans, civil rights, and 
death penalty cases” (Hug 2000-2001: 322).  These comments suggest that at least some 
of the judges on the Ninth Circuit suspect that political, rather than administrative, 
concerns are the central motivation for proposals to split up the circuit.  
Hypotheses 
Based on the existing literature, we posit that the (co) sponsorship of circuit-
splitting bills are a kind of court-curbing exercise “to restrict, remove, or otherwise limit 
the Court’s power” (Clark 2011: 19), and that these bills represent position-taking 
behavior by members of Congress. The introduction of legislation to split the Ninth 
                                               
16 Senator Slade Gorton (R-Washington).135 Congressional Record S 5026, 101st 
Congress, lst Sess. (daily ed. May 9, 1989). 
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Circuit sends an ideological signal that a legislator is taking a stance against liberal 
politics and judicial activism as embodied by the court. As such, it should be the case that 
conservative members have more reason to seek electoral gain by sponsoring splitting 
bills targeting the Ninth Circuit.  Relatedly, bill sponsorship may be a response to the 
perception that the perspectives of “California judges” (Kline 1998: 779) in the Ninth 
Circuit are out of step with the preferences of a Congress member’s home state.  We also 
expect (co)sponsorship to be more likely for legislators who are more ideologically 
distant from the Ninth Circuit. This suggests the following three hypotheses. 
H1: Conservative legislators will be more likely to (co)sponsor splitting bills than 
liberal legislators. 
H2: A legislator will be more likely to (co)sponsor splitting bills as policy views 
diverge between their state and California.  
H3:  A legislator will be more likely to (co)sponsor splitting bills if they are 
ideologically distant from the Ninth Circuit.  
However, the literature also shows that bill sponsors express concerns about 
judicial performance and ineffective management of caseload as a motivation for filing 
splitting bills.  Concerns about high caseload were also expressed in early proposals 
about splitting the Eighth Circuit (Stanley and Russell 1982: 124) and the Fifth Circuit 
(Banks 2000; Barrow and Walker 1988).  Reversals by the Supreme Court have also been 
frequently referenced by supporters of a split (Ducey 2016; Scalia 1998). 
H4:  As caseloads in the Ninth Circuit increase, legislators will be more likely to 
sponsor or co-sponsor splitting bills.  
 17 
H5:  With more Supreme Court oversight of the Ninth Circuit, legislators will 
sponsor or co-sponsor more splitting bills.   
Data and variables 
Using the Congressional record, we collected data on each bill, noting the 
chamber, sponsor, sponsor’s state and party, committee, and co-sponsors for bills 
introduced in the 84th-111th Congresses (1955-2011).17  Legislator ideology is measured 
using the Poole and Rosenthal Common Space scores, which range from -1 (most 
conservative) to +1 (most liberal).  We also control for party effects using a dichotomous 
indicator of party membership, coded 1 if the legislator is a Democrat and 0 otherwise. 
Because those on the ideological fringes may behave differently from moderate 
legislators in their sponsorship and co-sponsorship behavior (Harward and Moffett 2010; 
Lazarus 2013), we follow convention (e.g., Lebo and Koger 2017) and include the 
absolute value of the legislators’ first dimension Common Space Score, with higher 
values indicating more extreme legislators.  We also account for whether a legislator was 
a member of the Judiciary Committee in their chamber, as such members should be more 
attuned to the needs and performance of the courts than other legislators.  If splitting bills 
are a result of institutional performance factors, this should lead Judiciary Committee 
members to be more active in (co)sponsoring bills. 
                                               
17 Like Clark (2011), we use the legislator in a given Congress as the unit of analysis.  In 
addition to being in keeping with the existing literature on Congressional attempts at 
court curbing, this modeling strategy has the statistical benefit of making estimation 
computationally easier by reducing the number of zeros (non-sponsorships) in our data.  
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Just as there may be differences in legislative activity according to party and 
committee membership, differences also may be due to chamber or majority party 
status.  Indicators of both are included as controls.  Similarly, members up for reelection 
may behave differently than those not campaigning, and some work suggests they may 
sponsor more constituency bills immediately before re-election (Meinke 2008).  To 
account for this, we include a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if it is an election year 
and 0 otherwise.18 
Greater ideological distance between the judges of the Ninth Circuit and a 
member of Congress is likely to result in more legislative activity.19  To measure the 
ideological distance between a legislator and the Ninth Circuit, we utilize the Judicial 
Common Space scores (Martin et al. 2007), which allow researchers to place judicial and 
legislative actors in the same ideological space.  The ideological distance measure takes 
the absolute value of the difference of a legislator’s common space score and the Ninth 
Circuit median, with higher values indicating more ideological divergence.  The greater 
the divergence, the less satisfaction there should be with judicial outputs. 
                                               
18 Because our unit of analysis is the legislator in a given Congress, the election year 
variable is always 1 for members of the House.  While we believe this is theoretically 
appropriate given House members near constant state of campaigning, our results remain 
substantively and statistically unchanged if the election variable is omitted. 
19 Although we would like to include the congruence between constituent opinion and the 
9th Circuit outputs, unfortunately no measure exists to put state public opinion and 
judicial preferences on the same scale.   
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As discussed above, much of the public statements made criticizing the Ninth 
Circuit for its liberal politics reference California as an ideological cue.  The greater the 
policy divergence between a member’s state and California, the more likely the legislator 
should be to (co)sponsor legislation. To measure state preferences, we draw from state 
level policy mood data made available by Enns and Koch (2013).  These data are 
available from 1956 to 2010 and extend the Stimson (1991) measures of policy mood (a 
measure for more or less government) to the state level using multilevel regression and 
post-stratification techniques.  We create a variable that is the absolute value of the 
difference between policy mood in California and the MC’s state, and average it over the 
two years of the Congress.20 In addition, we control for electoral pressures that may 
incentivize legislators from states within the Ninth Circuit to sponsor splitting bills by 
including a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a member of Congress was from a state 
in the Ninth Circuit and 0 otherwise. 
Lastly, we include variables that tap into performance-based reasons why 
legislators would sponsor bills to split the Ninth Circuit. As a measure of caseload, we 
utilized federal court management statistics gathered by the Administrative Office of the 
Courts. We then created a measure of total filings per authorized judgeship for the entire 
time period under study.  Information on Supreme Court oversight of the Ninth Circuit 
was taken from the Spaeth Supreme Court database; the variable includes decisions to 
reverse, reverse and remand, and vacate and remand for all orally argued cases. We 
standardize this measure by dividing it by the number of cases from the Ninth Circuit 
                                               
20 For the 84th and 111th Congresses, only a single year—1956 and 2010 respectively—is 
used to calculate average mood in California and the member of Congress’s home state.  
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accepted for review in that year, creating a percentage. Both of these measures are 
averaged over the two years of the Congress. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
Trends in circuit-splitting bills 
To get a broader sense of how circuit-splitting bills originate, Table 1 shows some 
key characteristics of bill sponsors.  In terms of region, about 76 percent of all bill 
sponsors or co-sponsors are from states in the Ninth Circuit (excluding California).  Idaho 
led the way with 32 (co)sponsors, followed by Alaska, Oregon, and Washington with 27, 
19, and 19 (co)sponsors respectively.  Outside the circuit, bills were filed from members 
of Congress from a wide variety of states including Alabama, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.  While 10 bills had no co-sponsors, the average 
number of co-sponsors was 2; co-sponsorship reflects a mix of Ninth Circuit and outside 
state participation. In the House, Rep. Mike Simpson (R-ID) sponsored the most bills of 
any of his colleagues (11), while there were three senators tied for first, sponsoring 5 bills 
apiece (John Ensign of Nevada, Frank Murkowski of Alaska, and Slade Gorton of 
Washington).   
[Figure 2 here] 
With respect to partisanship, Republicans dominate the ranks of sponsors of 
circuit splitting bills. In the House, just over 91 percent of all (co)sponsors were 
Republicans, while in the Senate, Republicans made up 85 percent of all sponsors and co-
sponsors.21  To see how bill sponsorship relates to ideology, Figure 2 plots the Common 
                                               
21 The data show that while efforts to rein in the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit 
may coincide on occasion, the two appear to be distinct processes on the whole.  When 
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Space scores of bill sponsors and cosponsors over time, by chamber. The top panel shows 
that bills from the House have tended to come mostly from moderate Republicans (the 
modal common space score is 0.273), but that there has been an uptick of interest from 
more conservative Republicans since the mid-1990s, including twelve representatives 
whose ideology is at least a standard deviation more conservative than the median 
member of the House.  The five Democratic (co)sponsors in the post-war era all come 
from states covered by the Ninth Circuit, suggesting that regional concerns were likely 
the driving force behind their actions.  On the Senate side (Figure 2, bottom panel), the 
few Democratic bill sponsors have been ideological moderates, while bills from 
Republicans have increasingly come from more conservative senators.  In the 2000-2009 
period, seven Republican senators whose ideology puts them at least one standard 
deviation from the chamber median sponsored circuit-splitting legislation.  For example, 
a 2009 sponsor, Senator Ensign, is 1.7 standard deviations more conservative than the 
median senator in the 111th Congress.  All together, these findings are consistent with 
previous work that finds court curbing in the post-war period has come primarily from 
conservatives (Clark 2011; Bell and Scott 2006).22  
                                                                                                                                            
we include a control for Supreme Court curbing bills in the model, it fails to reach 
statistical significance in all specifications, so we omit it from the models shown here. 
22 At the level of the institution, the court curbing literature suggests that bills should 
arise when the Ninth Circuit is more liberal than Congress, because of the conservative 
nature of court curbing in the 20th century. In the appendix, we graph each chamber and 
the Ninth Circuit by their median Judicial Common Space score over time.  In the House, 
 22 
As has been well established in the literature and in the Congressional record, 
concerns about ineffective management of caseloads often accompany circuit-splitting 
bills. Over the period of our study, there is steady growth in both filings and caseload per 
judge, with a much sharper increase after 2000. However, this tells us nothing about how 
“well” the Ninth Circuit managed this caseload—only that it increased.  Both sponsors 
and supporters of circuit-splitting bills have also pointed to Supreme Court oversight of 
the Ninth Circuit as evidence of ineffective management of caseloads.  Based on the 
percentage of Ninth Circuit cases that the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and 
remanded, and vacated and remanded per year, there is some facial validity to claims 
about efficiency, as this oversight increases over the time period of our study. Of course, 
increased Supreme Court oversight of a particular circuit may not reflect poor 
performance at all, but rather ideological divergence between the two courts (Scott 2006).  
Using the Judicial Common Space scores for the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, 
the correlation between Supreme Court – Ninth Circuit ideological distance and Supreme 
Court oversight is a modest .30, which suggests ideological conflict among levels of the 
judicial hierarchy is probably at least a partial driver of oversight, consistent with Scott 
(2006).   
 In sum, the descriptive results suggest that both political and performance-related 
concerns may be behind the emergence of circuit-splitting legislation.  Next, we turn to a 
multivariate model that allows us to control for competing explanations.  
Explaining bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship 
                                                                                                                                            
the Ninth Circuit was more liberal than that chamber in 11 of the 13 years when a 
splitting bill was filed; in the Senate, it was 12 out of 15 years.  
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To test our hypotheses about the predictors of bill (co)sponsorship, we utilize a 
negative binomial regression model (NBRM) to account for the discrete nature of the 
outcome of interest and to correct for overdispersion in the data, leading to unbiased 
point estimates and standard errors.23 We also specified the model as a zero-inflated 
negative binomial regression model (not shown) and achieved substantively similar 
results.24 
                                               
23 Because our dependent variable is a count, ordinary least squares regression is 
inappropriate. Likelihood ratio tests show significant evidence of overdispersion, making 
the NBRM preferable to the Poisson regression model. We use a gamma distribution for 
the cluster-specific (legislator) mean, providing a closed-form likelihood approximating a 
random-intercept NBRM (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012).   
24 Excessive zeros can be problematic by causing the data to be overdispersed and 
therefore inappropriate for Poisson models, but they do not necessarily require 
researchers to employ a zero-inflated model.  Rather, zero-inflated models should be used 
when there is a theoretical expectation that the data generating process for the zeros is 
different from the non-zero counts (Long and Freese 2006; Allison 2012).  We do not 
have reason to believe there are different processes at work in our data.  However we 
believe that if there were two different processes, it would be the political factors, rather 
than performance factors, that make a legislator always a zero (never sponsoring or 
cosponsoring).  We tested this using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model 
and found the results to be substantively similar to the negative binomial model presented 
in the text.  Given the robustness of the findings and the lack of a priori theoretical 
 24 
Due to the high correlation between party and ideology in the modern era (r = 
.84), we estimate three separate models: one including ideology, one including party, and 
one combined model with both variables. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 Table 2 displays the results of NBRM estimating the number of sponsors and co-
sponsors of circuit splitting bills per congress.  Hypothesis 1 predicted that increased 
conservatism would lead to increased bill (co)sponsorship, which is borne out in our data.  
Starting with the ideology-only model, consistent with Mayhew’s argument, circuit 
splitting bills provide conservative legislators with a vehicle for position taking against a 
court with a national reputation for liberal politics.  Additionally, bill sponsors are not 
ideological outliers.  Rather, splitting bills are more likely to come from legislators who 
are more ideologically in-step with others in their chamber. Taken together, these 
findings indicate circuit-splitting bills are more likely to be introduced by mainstream 
conservative members looking to use symbolic legislation to establish their conservative 
bona fides. 
 Moving next to the party-only model, Democratic members of Congress are less 
likely to propose circuit-splitting legislation.  In the combined model presented in the 
right-hand side of Table 2, a similar pattern emerges.  But given the increase in political 
polarization and party-line voting since 1980 (Rhode 1991; Aldrich 2011; Lebo and 
Koger 2017), have incentives for legislators changed in recent decades? To evaluate this 
possibility, we estimated a truncated model using only the 96th-111th Congresses (1979-
                                                                                                                                            
justification for a zero-inflated model, we are confident our results are not biased by the 
number of zeros in our data.   
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2011).25  Here, we see the increased role of partisanship in bill sponsorship. Democrats 
are significantly less likely to propose or co-sponsor legislation to split the Ninth Circuit, 
while ideology is no longer a significant predictor.  This is unsurprising given the 
increased ideological homogeneity within parties (Lebo and Koger 2017) and greater 
party unity in recent decades.  Nevertheless, whether political motivations are 
conceptualized in terms of ideology or party, circuit-splitting bills are more likely to 
emerge from those on the political right. 
 Hypotheses 2 and 3 also relate to the role of preferences in generating splitting 
bills, consistent with Clark (2009; 2011).  The results show that as the public mood in 
California grows more distant from the public mood in the legislator’s state, more 
splitting bills are sponsored, in support of H2. However, we do not find any evidence in 
support of H3; as ideological distance increases between the Ninth Circuit and the 
member of Congress, there is no significant effect on (co)sponsorship. Together, this 
suggests that it is not ideological disagreement between the legislator and the Ninth 
Circuit (as a whole) fueling the rise in bill sponsorship, but rather that bill 
(co)sponsorship is driven by the policy divergence between a legislator’s state and 
California.    The association with California and liberal politics allows for effective 
position taking by members who come from ideologically distant states.  As discussed 
earlier, California has served as an enduring symbol of liberal politics, and as such, the 
                                               
25 Full results are presented in Appendix A.  Additional alternative specifications are also 
presented in Appendices B and C.  The findings are robust and mirror the analyses 
presented in the text. 
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rhetoric and proposals focused on the Ninth Circuit make good use of this heuristic for 
electoral benefit. 
Looking at the control variables, bill (co)sponsors are not more likely to be 
members on the Judiciary Committee, adding further support to the notion that bills are a 
function of political, rather than institutional or performance factors.  However, bill 
sponsors are more likely to be senators, majority party members, and represent states in 
the 9th Circuit.  Members are not more likely to (co)sponsor legislation when they are up 
for reelection. 
 The remaining two hypotheses address “apolitical” rationales for dividing the 
Ninth Circuit: caseload and Supreme Court oversight.  Here, we do find support for these 
explanations for splitting bills, as both the change in caseload and Supreme Court 
oversight are associated with increases in splitting bills.  In order to ascertain how the 
political and performance-based factors work together, we estimated the changes in 
predicted probabilities for several quantities of interest.   
 In the interest of parsimony, we focus our discussion about substantive effects on 
the results from the combined model with both party and ideology.  For liberal 
Democrats, with all other variables held constant, we find that increasing caseload per 
judge from its lowest to highest value does not increase the expected number of 
sponsorships.  Likewise, increasing caseload does not affect bill sponsorship for 
moderate Democrats.  In contrast, for moderate Republicans, the same increase in 
caseload produces an increase of 0.01 in the expected number of sponsorships; the 
expected count increases by 0.04 for conservative Republicans.  While these increases 
may seem modest, a standard deviation increase in caseload per judge (160 cases) results 
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in 1.6 bills proposed by moderate Republicans and 6.4 bills by conservative Republicans. 
These gains are more impressive when one considers the modal number of 
(co)sponsorships is zero. 
Supreme Court oversight also has an effect on the expected number of circuit 
splitting bills proposed per Congress, and the magnitude of the change again depends on 
ideology and partisanship.  As with caseload, liberal and moderate Democrats are not 
expected to sponsor any legislation regardless of the number of times the Ninth Circuit is 
reversed by the Supreme Court.  As the percentage of reversals increases, only 
conservative Republicans respond by sponsoring more circuit-splitting bills. A standard 
deviation increase in reversals increases the likely number of bills sponsored by 
conservative Republicans by 0.12. 
 Why do we observe such stark differences in behavior?  The answer to this (as 
well as many other questions about Congress) lies in electoral incentives.  Members of 
Congress pursue legislation when it concerns issues salient to their constituents (Lazarus 
2013), thus benefiting the legislator electorally by increasing their support among 
members of the attentive public and potentially improving their campaign fundraising 
prospects (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Rocca and Gorden 2010). Opposing an 
“activist” court that is linked with liberal California politics appears to be an 
advantageous position for conservative Republicans to take, but not Democrats.  Thus, 
the presence of performance-related reasons for dividing the Ninth Circuit (e.g., increases 
in caseload and Supreme Court reversals) serves only to motivate those legislators with 
other electoral incentives to act.  Below, we speculate on what this means for the 
prospects for real judicial reform and interbranch relations. 
 28 
Discussion 
Compared to past studies of circuit-splitting bills directed at the Ninth Circuit, this 
paper utilizes the most extensive dataset ever compiled to test the proposition that 
electoral incentives are the primary motivators for judicial reform proposals that would 
divide the Ninth Circuit.  We find strong evidence that conservative, Republican 
members of Congress are more likely to sponsor or co-sponsor splitting bills, and that 
they are even more likely to do so in response to performance-related factors like rising 
caseloads and more Supreme Court reversals. Liberal members and Democrats are not 
similarly moved when such performance-related factors exist.  Legislators also sponsor or 
join onto bills when the policy preferences of their home state are distant from those of 
California.  
Taken together, our results are consistent with the Congressional literature on how 
the electoral connection structures the incentives and priorities for members of Congress. 
Even purely symbolic measures can serve an important electoral purpose (Hill and 
Hurley 2002), and sponsoring or co-sponsoring bills is a relatively safe way to for a 
member to communicate their position to key constituencies (Lazarus 2013; Fenno 1978; 
Mayhew 1974). By highlighting their opposition to a liberal court linked with California, 
a member of Congress can demonstrate his or her conservative bona fides and potentially 
receive more support from ideologically aligned groups (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003).  
As others have observed (Fish 1973; Thompson and Roper 1980), judicial administration 
is typically not a high priority for members of Congress.  Writing almost thirty years ago 
about the splitting of the Fifth Circuit, Barrow and Walker contend that “rarely are 
matters pertaining to the court system considered so urgent as to outweigh political 
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considerations” (1988: 256). Thus, even objectively reasonable arguments for dividing a 
circuit are unlikely to go far unless there is support from the “attentive public” and key 
organized interests.  Even then, the logistical challenges and financial costs associated 
with reorganizing the federal judiciary may dissuade members of either party from 
casting a vote to make a split a reality.   
Our findings also highlight the distinctive nature of the legislative attacks on the 
Ninth Circuit relative to what other circuits experience; indeed, the Ninth Circuit appears 
to be viewed in a similar manner to the Supreme Court, in terms of its potential for 
position taking via court curbing bills.  This is consistent with a broader electoral strategy 
to engage in position taking by taking a stance against an “activist” judiciary (Clark 2009; 
Keele and Malmsheimer 2016).   We should note that while court-curbing here takes the 
form of circuit-splitting bills, there might very well be electoral incentives for Democrats 
to sponsor other forms of court-curbing bills directed at “conservative” circuits in the 
future, and for Republicans to target other “liberal” circuits as well.  Such bills would 
similarly provide electoral benefits by creating an issue constituency and politicizing the 
judiciary (Clark 2011).  
Although none of the Ninth Circuit splitting bills have succeeded in becoming law 
(to date), they have had an impact on the court in other ways.  For instance, judges in the 
Ninth Circuit have openly acknowledged that it was a drain on the work of the court to 
defend or respond to repeated split attempts (e.g., Goodwin 1989). Unlike the Supreme 
Court’s reactions to court curbing (Clark 2009), active judges in the Ninth Circuit have 
responded directly to legislative proposals by engaging in Congressional testimony, 
lobbying, and engagement with the press – all of which take time away from the 
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responsibilities of judging.26 This type of scrutiny is not dissimilar to the scrutiny that 
unpopular federal agencies can face from Congress, but it is distinct from what other 
courts within the lower federal judiciary must contend with as they go about their 
business. 
   There are, of course, limitations to our findings.  Due to data constraints, we are 
not able to estimate models that include bills sponsored through the present day.  Given 
the increases in party unity and polarization during the last six years of the Obama 
presidency, it seems likely that partisanship and ideology would continue to be strong 
predictors of bills to split the Ninth Circuit, but other dynamics related to the federal 
judiciary (e.g., the death of Justice Scalia in 2016) might differ from the time period 
under study.  In addition, we recognize that we lack a direct measure of public opinion 
specifically about the Ninth Circuit over time, which would be a better way to gauge 
whether circuit-splitting attempts are a response to constituent opinion and issue salience. 
Unfortunately, no such survey data exists, requiring us to rely on proxy measures like the 
Enns and Koch public mood variable.  While we can only speculate about the effect of 
including a more direct measure of opinion about the Ninth Circuit, it seems likely that 
there would be differences in awareness and affect toward the court based on partisanship 
and perhaps exposure to “sensationalist” media outlets, which has been found to 
undermine public support for the Supreme Court (Johnston and Bartels 2010). We also 
                                               
26 In the archival documents of former Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin (housed at the 
Oregon Historical Society library), there are a number of memos that reference how the 
hearings and split proposals were a source of distraction that, on occasion, slowed the 
work of the court on pending cases.  
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would expect that those constituents who follow conservative talk radio and cable news 
to be more aware of the Ninth Circuit than any other court of appeals, given the 
frequency with which the Ninth appears to be mentioned by those outlets.  Lastly, there is 
some historical evidence that suggests that bill sponsors are responding to concerns 
expressed by particular industries (e.g., timber), and because we lack systematic data on 
these types of economic concerns, we cannot account for variation in interest group 
pressure connected to regional politics.  But in spite of these limitations, we believe that 
this paper represents an important step in expanding our understanding of court curbing 
and inter-branch dynamics.  
While the Supreme Court is said to enjoy a “reservoir of goodwill” (Gibson 
2015), it is less clear what impact the sustained efforts to split the Ninth Circuit have had 
on that court’s legitimacy.  In the wake of the Trump presidency, the Ninth Circuit has 
again received attention and criticism from conservative circles, including the president, 
in response to specific decisions.  It seems likely that the direct criticisms from the 
president will serve to only strengthen the linkage between the court and liberal politics, 
and possibly bolster the electoral incentives for Republican legislators to continue 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Bill Sponsors and Co-Sponsors 
 
Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Region 










Min – Max: 0 – 10 
Mean: 2.0 (SD: 2.9) 























Table 2: Negative Binomial Model of Bill Sponsorship per Congress, 1955-2011* 
 Ideology Party Combined 
 Coef. (Std. Err.) p-value 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) p-value 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) p-value 
Political variables       
Ideology (+) 4.339 
(0.549) 







0.000 — — -1.595 
(0.886) 
0.072 


























































Performance variables       






















N= 15,147 LL= -574.54  LL= -573.11  LL= -570.94  
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